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Mississippi Palladium.

THOMAS A. FALCONER, PUBLISHER. STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION WILL PERPETUATE THE UNION. HENRY STITH, EDITOR & PROPRIETOR.

VOLUME 1. HOLLY SPRINGS, MISSISSIPPI, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1851. NUMBER 25.

TERMS OF THE PALLADIUM.

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ADDRESS OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, To the People of Mississippi.

Fellow-Citizens:—

Nominated as a candidate for Governor of the State of Mississippi, in the manner which has been already announced to you, the relations which have so long subsisted between us of Representative and constituency are changed, and my name is presented for your suffrage for an office of a different character from those with which you have heretofore trusted me. With feelings of profound gratitude I offer you my acknowledgments for the undeserved honors you have heretofore bestowed upon me, and avail myself of this, the only mode which my health enables me to adopt, to make a review of the course I have pursued as your Representative to the Federal Government, and to state the general policy by which I will be governed if you should elect me to be your Chief Executive.

Openly, and at all times avowing the principles of Democracy, as defined and established in 1798 and '99, and believing the best interests of the whole country, and the preservation of our Government in its original purity, depend on the preservation of those principles, I entered public life to uphold and maintain them. But though elected as a Democrat, I considered myself a Representative of the people, and feel pride in the conviction that the severest scrutiny into my public conduct, cannot find an occasion on which the zeal of the partizan has made me forget the duty of a Representative.

In 1844, I advocated the election of Mr. Polk to the Chief Magistracy of the United States, and, as a member of Congress, entered the House of Representatives at the first session which followed his inauguration. It was my good fortune to see the success of those principles we had advocated, by the repeal of a Protective Tariff, and the establishment of *ad valorem* duties, by the overthrow of a partial, wasteful and corrupting scheme of Internal Improvements by the Federal Government; by the annexation of Texas—and generally by adherence to our cardinal principle, strict construction of the Constitution. When in the discharge of that duty of the Federal Government which requires it to repel the invasion of a State, we became involved in hostilities with Mexico. I voted to declare that war existed, and to provide the means necessary for its prosecution. When the sons of Mississippi who had volunteered, and been received into the military service of the United States, were organized as a Regiment, they elected me their Colonel, and on notification of the fact, I left my seat in Congress and joined them on their way to Mexico. After our return to the United States, by expiration of the term of service, I again became your Representative in the Senate of the United States.

When the treaty of peace was submitted to the Senate for ratification, I found it objectionable in many of its features, and endeavored to amend it, with some success, but failed on that point which I considered most important—the modification of the boundary to be established between the two countries. I sought to obtain a mountain barrier which would include within the limits of the United States all the valley of the Rio Grande, a country which, by its contiguity and climate, I felt would inure to our advantage, whilst it gave a boundary easily defended, and which separated countries so distinct from each other as to put far from us the probability of a future collision; also to change the line from the Rio Grande to the Pacific, so as to secure the Railroad route to San Diego, and a valley on which a settlement might be formed, which would best serve to restrain the Indians within our Territory from incursions into Mexico. This amendment was sustained by but eleven votes. It was the settled policy to acquire Territory by the treaty of peace. This vote left no hope that such a change of boundary could be effected as I believed was desired to the Southern States, and the question assumed to my mind this form—shall the treaty be ratified, and the war terminated, or shall the treaty be rejected, and hostilities be renewed? Our army was in possession of the Capitol of Mexico, and was rapidly assuming a self sustaining character. To continue the war must finally lead to the total destruction of the Mexican government, and in the phrase of the day, to the swallowing up of the whole of Mexico by the United States. There was a large party who desired this result, and Southern men of the highest stations were of it. Between two evils, I chose the least, and voted for the treaty.

Long before the treaty was ratified, in anticipation of the acquisition of new Territory, the North manifested its will, both in and out of Congress, for the exclusion of the Southern slaveholders from all participation in any Territory which should be thus acquired. They had not shown the same desire to engross either all the personal hazards, or pecuniary burthens of the war.

In 1848, various attempts were made to give governments to California and New Mexico, in connection with the Territory of Oregon. A special committee was raised in the Senate, by which a bill was reported to give the highest grade of Territorial government to Oregon, and the lowest grade of Territorial government to California and New Mexico, with the restriction on the two last, that no law should be passed "respecting the prohibition or establishment of African slavery." It provided for a judicial decision of the question in controversy, the Constitutional right of the owners of slaves to take that species of property into the Territories.

I preferred a Judicial to a Congressional decision, both because I hoped it would be more just, and believed it would be more permanent. I did not doubt the Constitutional right, nor fear the decision of an impartial tribunal. If rendered in our favor, we might more confidently have looked forward to Legislative protection. This measure of Compromise was treated with a marked want of consideration in the House of Representatives, where Northern power held control. It was promptly laid on the table without examination or reference, and a bill was passed for a Territorial government of Oregon without any provision for California or New Mexico. To this the Senate attached an amendment by which the Missouri Compromise was "declared to be in full force, and binding for the future organization of the Territories of the United States in the same sense, and with the same understanding, with which it was originally adopted." In this amendment, the House refused to concur by a vote of 83 to 121, and the Senate receded from its amendment by a vote of 29 to 25. I had striven with many other Southern Senators and members for each of these plans of Compromise, and with melancholy forebodings witnessed their defeat. The Oregon bill, as it passed, was, in effect, the usurpation of power by the Federal Government to exclude slave property from a Territory of the United States. The assurance that the Missouri Compromise line would be extended to the Pacific at the next session of Congress, satisfied some Southern members, and, I have the best reason to believe, induced the President to perform the disagreeable task of approving the bill. I distrusted promises for to-morrow, of that which could have been as easily executed to-day, and, with all the ability I possessed, opposed the passage of the law.

The sectional controversy on the right of the South to introduce her slaves into Territories, the common property of the States, continued, and the opposition increased in rancor as it increased in power. The eventful session of 1850 found those Territories which had been acquired from Mexico, still unprovided with government. For this, neither myself, nor those who acted with me, were in the least degree responsible. We especially desired to give laws to the country, and protection to those citizens of the United States who might migrate to it, but the anti-slavery majority in Congress preferred no Territorial government, to one which did not contain a prohibition of slavery, obviously relying upon the effect which the threat to enact such prohibition would have on the migration of slaveholders, and equally perhaps upon the knowledge that slave property, more than any other, requires the protection of law. At this session, as at the one which preceded it, the Committee on Territories introduced bills for Territorial governments, and for the admission of California as a State of the Union. They met with little favor from Southern Senators. The position was generally held by them that the power to admit new States did not confer the power to create a State, this being the objection which had been so ably presented by the Committee on the Judiciary, in their report of the preceding session, on the bill to admit California as a State.

On the 29th of January, 1850, Mr. Clay introduced a series of resolutions, declaring that California, with suitable boundaries, ought, upon her application, to be admitted as one of the States of this Union, and that as slavery did not exist by law in any of the territory acquired from Mexico, it was inexpedient for Congress to provide by law either for its introduction or exclusion, and that territorial governments ought to be established for all of said territory not included within the limits of California, without any restriction or condition on the subject of slavery. That the western boundary of the State of Texas ought to be fixed on the Rio del Norte up to the Southern line of New Mexico, and thence with that line eastwardly, excluding any portion of New Mexico. That it was inexpedient to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, whilst that institution existed in the State of Maryland, without the consent of that State, without the consent of the District, and without just compensation to the owners of slaves within the District. That it was expedient to prohibit, within the District, the trade in slaves brought into it from States or places beyond the limits of the District, either to be sold there as merchandise, or to be transported to other markets without the District of Columbia. That more effectual provision ought to be made for the restitution and delivery of persons bound to service or labor in any State, who many escape into any other State or territory in the Union. That Congress had no power to prohibit or obstruct the trade in slaves between the slaveholding States, the admission or exclusion depending exclusively upon their own particular laws. With more than ordinary, unanimity and with far more than ordinary severity, these resolutions were opposed by the Senators of the Southern States. They were attacked as soon as read, and most fiercely, by some who have since been the open advocates—the champions of that "compromise" scheme between which, and this series of resolutions, there is so striking a resemblance that their author has said there was no material difference.

It was evident that the power existed to bring California as a State into the Union, notwithstanding the gross defects and irregularities of the case, and we had little to expect for the protection of Southern interests in any territorial bill which would probably pass the two houses of Congress. In this condition of affairs, it was proposed to raise a special committee, to which should be referred the whole subject in controversy, in relation to slave property and the territories. I expected that a committee would be formed, equally representing the two great divisions of interest and of opinion. From such a committee, alone, could any beneficial result have been expected. The committee, as organized, was composed of six Senators of non-slaveholding States, and six of slaveholding States; of the latter, one, (Mr. Bell, of Tennessee,) had introduced resolutions which committed him to the admission of California as a State, and to the partition of Texas. The Chairman, who, had the members been equally divided, would have held the balance of power, was Mr. Clay, of Kentucky, whose resolutions sufficiently indicated what his course would be. In addition to the bills reported by the committee on territories, the committee on the judiciary had reported a bill to provide more effectually for the re-capture of fugitive slaves, and Mr. Benton, of Missouri, had brought in a bill to reduce the limits of Texas below those claimed by her when, as an independent State, she was annexed to the Union. This last bill was strongly opposed at the time of its introduction, and arraigned, by my colleague, as one which would "completely unsettle the question of slavery in all the vast domain which it proposes to purchase from the State of Texas."

The special committee of thirteen united the bills from the committee on territories, for a State of California, for governments for the territories of Utah and New Mexico, and for the establishment of the boundary of Texas, the latter "with inconsiderable variation," and reported them to the Senate as one proposition. The boundaries of California had not been reduced to suitable limits, as was proposed in Mr. Clay's resolutions, but still embraced the whole sea coast we had acquired on the Pacific, and retained their immense extent and unnatural form on the south and east. No objection as it existed against the bill when it came from the committee on territories had, to my mind, been removed: yet, strange to say, Southern Senators who had most promptly opposed those resolutions and that bill, were the advocates of this proposition from the "compromise" committee. I opposed them conjointly, as I had singly. My judgment assured me that there were radical defects in the case of California. I could not believe they were cured by attaching to the bill territorial governments, in which the vaunted merit was, that they did not contain the Wilmot proviso, because it was unnecessary; because, according to the report of the committee, "there was never any occasion for it to accomplish the professed object with which it was originally offered;" the action of the people of California being cited to establish this position. It was a poor satisfaction to me to be told that Congress would abstain from legislation, and that such non-action would work the exclusion of the South. Still less were the defects to be cured by taking territory from under the jurisdiction of a slaveholding State to transfer it to the custody of Congress and the control of a population who had already manifested their hostility to the institution of slavery. The last proposition was to me as odious as any other could have been. I found in it an unwarranted interference with the territory of a State, and a stain upon our country's history, by denying the justice of that claim, in defence of which we had prosecuted the war against Mexico.

But if my opinions had been less fixed, the question was closed by popular action in the State of Mississippi, and the specific instructions I had received from her Legislature, in their resolution of March 5th, 1850, in these words; "Resolved, That the admission of California into the Union as a sovereign State, with its present Constitution—the result of the aforesaid false and unjust policy on the part of the Government of the United States—would be an act of fraud and oppression on the rights of the people of the slaveholding States, and it is the sense of this Legislature that our Senators and Representatives should, to the extent of their ability, resist it by all honorable and constitutional means." To these instructions I gave a cordial and sincere obedience, laboring, not with eye service, and giving but formal and *reluctant* compliance.

Yet ingenious falsehood has attempted to represent this as an offence, because certain anti-slavery Senators also opposed this "compromise" scheme, concealing the fact that other anti-slavery Senators supported it. If the judgment of those who make such misrepresentations had not been blinded by malice, they must have perceived that this was to arraign the people and legislature of Mississippi, whose expressed will and instructions I obeyed. It is an instructive fact in the case, that when these combined propositions failed, and they again came up for consideration as separate measures, the opposition which had originally arrayed itself against them could never again be united. The Southern strength was lost by division; until, in the last struggle, the South offered but feeble resistance to measures which it had at first, with great unanimity, most firmly and sternly opposed. My own course was not confined to mere opposition. I strove to amend the so-called "compromise" bill, by giving that security to the property of the slaveholder, who might migrate to the territories, to which I felt his property, like all other, was entitled. I asked that the legislature of the territory should have power to pass laws for the protection of every kind of property which might have been, or should be, "conformably to the Constitution and laws of the United States, held in, or introduced into, said territory." Upon this general and equitable proposition Southern Senators were divided, and on July 23d, 1850, my colleague offered an amendment, "That the said State of California shall never hereafter claim as within her boundaries, nor attempt to exercise jurisdiction over, any portion of the territory at present claimed by her, except that which is embraced within the following boundaries:" the southern boundary proposed was the parallel of 35 degrees 30 minutes; "and that a new territory should be established to consist of the country thus cut off." To which I offered the following amendment: "And that laws and usages existing in said territory, at the date of its acquisition by the United States, which deny or obstruct the right of any citizen of the United States to remove to, and reside in said territory, with any species of property legally held in any of the States of this Union, be, and are hereby declared to be, null and void." Mr. Clay opposed this amendment, on the ground of "non-intervention," and asked for the "difference the direct action of Congressional legislation upon the subject of slavery, to introduce it, or to prohibit, and the exercise of this power by Congress to repeal existing laws within territory, which existing laws have declared the abolition of slavery?" It was against the doctrine that the Mexican law excluded slave property from the territory, which was held, I believe, unanimously by the Northern Senators, and entertained by some from the South, that my amendment was introduced. I did not doubt our constitutional right to take slaves into the territory, but I claimed for my constituents that right should be recognized and protected; that this foreign obstruction to the enjoyment of their constitutional rights by citizens of the United States, should be removed; that it was the duty of Congress to relieve the citizen of the necessity of establishing his constitutional right, by an appeal to the courts. I denied that it followed, because we called upon the Congress of the United States to protect our property, that we therefore acknowledged the right to deprive us of that property; the first being a duty, the second expressly the Constitution. My colleague opposed this amendment, as useless, and because he apprehended "that the adoption of the amendment would put the bill itself in danger of defeat," arguing that the Constitution fully secured our rights; though, on July 25th, 1848, when the circumstances were far more favorable than now, he held a different opinion—(see Congressional Globe, 1st Session, 30th Congress, page 998)—"He contended that slavery could not exist without legislative protection. If a man should take a hundred slaves into one of these foreign territories, and they should be disposed to rebel against him, what law is there to which he can appeal? And suppose a man comes to steal his slaves to carry them to the Pacific, and the owner threatens to appeal to the law: he will be answered, you can do nothing—there is no law in the case. There are many in his section of the country disposed to emigrate to California; but there was not one who would be such a dolt as to carry a slave there, because he could hold him, in consequence of the hands of the local authorities being tied up, so that they could not interfere on the subject of slavery." The amendment was defeated—yeas 22, nays 33—not one Northern Senator voting for it. My colleague voting against it.

I strove in every form to reduce the limits of California; but the eagerness of the anti-slavery majority to bring in another non-slaveholding State, and at once to exclude the South from that rich territory, rendered all such efforts unavailing. Arguments based upon the faith implied in the Missouri Compromise, reasons founded on physical geography, were unheeded by the majority, in their lust for sectional dominion.

Though the Southern Convention, which assembled at Nashville in June, 1850, of which our fellow-citizen, W. L. Sharkey, was President, had declared, as an extreme concession, that they were willing to divide the territory by the line of 36-30, extending to the Pacific ocean, treating it as a question of property, to be divided between the sections of the Union, so that the rights of both be adequately secured in their respective shares—yet those Senators who have been called, in reproach, Southern Ultras, of whom I am one, voted for every proposition, by any line of division, to curtail the boundaries of California, and sustained it in so many forms, as to render it evident that no division could be effected. This was acknowledged by my colleague, who, speaking, August 6th, 1850, of the direct exercise of the power of this Government in restricting the boundaries of California, said he considered it "A very vain and useless thing to offer any such proposition. It has been voted down repeatedly. Such a direct proposition being hopeless of success, should we not try and attain the object in view by the only means in our power?" The mode he proposed was to submit to California, after she had been admitted as a State, whether she would consent to divide her territory, which, I suppose, few of my constituents will consider would have been a benefit to the South, without some provision which would have protected the country from the prohibition against slave property contained in the Constitution of California.

By the defeat of the "compromise" scheme, I have felt that several advantages were obtained. A new line for the division of Texas was adopted, which took less of her territory by some 30,000 square miles. Southern men were able to form a fugitive law more effectual than that which had been reported by the committee, and free from the very objectionable provision which required a master who re-captured his fugitive slave, upon application of the runaway, to enter into bond to try his right of property in the slave after his return to the State from which the slave had fled.—It left each measure to stand upon its own merits, and more fairly submitted the action of Representatives to the decision of their constituents. The Fugitive Slave law which now stands upon the Statute book, and which has been claimed as the concession which should satisfy the South for she had lost by the other measures was not the bill of the "compromise" committee, but was introduced by Mr. Mason, of Virginia, a so-called "Southern Ultra," and mainly advocated by that class of Southern Senators who opposed the "compromise." It did not pass like its predecessors of 1793, by Northern votes, but by the absenteeism of the North. The bill of '93 passed the Senate unanimously, and the House with but seven dissenting votes. The bill of 1850 received the support of three Northern Senators, 31 Northern Members. But had the North given such united support as their farthers gave, it surely could have been considered no concession to provide for the execution of a distinct provision in the compact by which the States are united. The necessity for such a law is a melancholy proof of the extent to which some of the States disregard a distinct obligation imposed upon them by the Constitution. For it is only when they are regardless of that obligation, that it can be necessary to call in the power of the Federal Government to legislate upon it. Yet we are turned aside from this consideration by the still more melancholy fact that the law is delayed and obstructed, even violently resisted, by mobs, sometimes wrung and tortured from its meaning and its purpose, by judicial officers, to whom the property holder looks for the maintainance of his right. In the Northern States there seems to be two great divisions upon the question of the restitution of fugitive slaves—the one who would resist the execution of the law of the land—but there seems to be no party which justifies it upon its merits, or who declare themselves in favor of it as an original measure. The cry of repeal is answered by the proposition to modify.

Taking Mr. Webster as an exponent of that class who would neither resist the law, nor repeal it, we are not left in doubt as to the character of the modification which they propose. The bill, introduced by him into the Senate, a short time before he left it, and to which he has referred in a speech, as indicating his view of the subject, required a jury trial at the place where the fugitive slave might be arrested. Such a modification would utterly destroy the efficacy of the law, and to my mind be more objectionable and offensive than its repeal.

I contributed what ability I possessed, to project and secure the passage of the fugitive slave law of 1850; seeking to make it as effectual as the power of Congress, and the spirit of the Constitution would permit. I opposed the attempt to engraft upon the bill a provision which would have made the treasury of the United States responsible for slaves, the delivery of whom should be prevented by a mob, because I considered the compact to require the delivery of the property, and that there was no authority in the Constitution which would justify Congress in taxing the people to pay for property which should be lost by failing to execute that Constitutional duty; and further, because I believed, instead of promoting the restitution of the property it would lead to the reverse result, and become a species of emancipation of slaves in the border States, by general taxation. I did not expect that the law would effect everything which would be desired. I could not, with the evidences around me expect that it would be faithfully observed. My zeal in its support, was rather due to the value I attached to the recognition of the principle it contained, and for which, (though of very little pecuniary advantage to us,) I am now in favor of insisting on the preservation of the law in all its essential features.

The only measure which the "Compromise" Committee originated, and judging from its character we may rejoice they did originate but one, was the bill in relation to the slave trade in the District of Columbia, which I consider a gross usurpation of power by the Federal Government, for which, not even the much abused plea of necessity can be offered in palliation.

In 1850 the Government retained, as the District of Columbia, only that territory which had been ceded by Maryland.—By a law of Congress passed in 1801, the laws of Maryland, which existed prior to the cession, were put in force in that portion of the District which had been received from Maryland. The Maryland law of 1796 therefore prevented slaves from being introduced into the District for sale from any other place than the State of Maryland, and the trade thus restricted, so far from being an evil, the increase of which requires legislation, had from other causes, so far diminished, that Mr. Mason, the Chairman of the Committee on the District of Columbia, made the following statement to the Senate. During the discussion of this bill, he said, on the 4th of September 1851: "I am informed, upon enquiry, that the fact is, that within the last few years so few slaves were brought into this District for sale, for the purpose of transportation, that the trade or business which some persons engage in, purchasing slaves for purpose of selling them again, has dwindled down until it has almost ceased to have an existence." Had the power then existed to pass such a law as that to which I have referred, there was no exigency which called for its exercise.

It has, however, sometimes been stated that Congress out re enacted the law of Maryland, and enforced in the District the policy of that State. This is very far from true. The law of Maryland was in force, and the bill was to take from citizens of Maryland the right they had previously enjoyed, to bring slaves into the County of Washington as into any of the counties of Maryland. The Maryland law of '96, like the Virginia law of '22, was to sustain the policy of those States against the further increase of slave population, and unlike the Congressional act of 1850, was not directed against commerce in slaves. They were passed before the constitutional prohibition against the further importation of Africans, went into effect and when the Northern States were adopting the policy of emancipation, and though general in their provisions, there is reason to believe were mainly intended to check the influx of slaves from the emancipating States, and to prevent the further importation of Africans. In support of this view, we find that in 1819 Virginia repealed her act of 1792, and permitted the introduction of slaves born within the United States, and the position was taken during the debate of the Senate, without being contradicted, that no prohibition now existed in the State of Maryland against the introduction of slaves from any other State of the Union. Not only, then, was the legislation of Congress dictated by a different motive from that of the States which made the cession, but was opposed to their present policy.—The power of a sovereign State to pass such a law is no evidence that Congress may do the same thing. The legislation of a State extends to all subjects which are not prohibited, the legislation of Congress is limited to the grants of the Constitution. To justify State legislation it is only necessary then to show that it has not been prohibited. To warrant Congressional legislation it must be shown that it has been permitted. Congress has "exclusive legislation in all cases whatever" over the District of Columbia, and over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of a State for "forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, and other needful buildings."

Exclusive, is not unlimited or plenary, and the phrase was, I think, only intended to imply that the State or States which should cede territory for a seat of Government, or consent to the sale of sites for the purposes enumerated, should not thereafter exercise Legislative power over such District or places. The power of Congress to legislate was to be drawn from the grants of the Constitution, and be exercised subject to all its limitations, and prohibitions. And if I am correct in this, the conclusion must follow that Congress has usurped authority not delegated to it, and disregarded prohibitions by which it was restrained. If I am [illegible] then it follows that Congress has plenary power within the District of Columbia, may establish religion, or nobility, or do any of the things prohibited in the articles of compact between the States.

The first Section of the bill under consideration, is as follows: "Be it enacted, &c., that from and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and fifty-one, it shall not be lawful to bring into the District of Columbia any slave whatever, for the purpose of being sold, or for the purpose of being placed in depot to be subsequently transferred to any other State, or place, to be sold as merchandise. And if any slave shall be brought into said District, by its owner, or by the authority and consent of its owner, contrary to the provisions of this act, such slave shall thereupon become liberated and free." The motion to strike out the first Section of the bill above recited was lost, yeas, 18, nays, 30. I voted with seventeen other Senators from Southern States to strike it out; my colleague voted against striking it out. I considered it a gross usurpation of power, and an odious discrimination against slave property in common territory, emphatically the neutral ground of the States. By the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, Congress has power "to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations." These were the only crimes which Congress was authorized to define; but by the above section it assumed to define a crime hitherto unknown to the United States, and provide for it a punishment. The crime was the act of bringing a slave into the District of Columbia with the intention to sell him there, or to keep him there for a time, to be transferred elsewhere, to be sold as merchandise. The punishment was to deprive the owner of his property by declaring the slave "liberated and free." By the fifth article, in amendment of the Constitution, it was provided "Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." But by this law a new crime was defined, not belonging to the cases enumerated in the Constitution; private property was to be taken, not for public use, and without just compensation: as a penalty for the offence of violating anti-slavery sentiment, by exercising that right of ownership over a slave in the District of Columbia, which is a necessary incident to the possession of that, as all other species of property which may be the subject of commerce.

I considered it a violation of the great principle of free trade within the States, which lay at the foundation of our Constitution, and, more than any other cause, contributed to the formation of the present Union of the States. If the right to pass freely with any species of property from State to State across the territory of other States be, as has been heretofore held, secured by the Constitution, how could Congress deny the enjoyment of that right in the District of Columbia? But if a citizen of Maryland should choose to bring his slave to the State of Mississippi, for sale here, this law would prevent him from stopping in the District of Columbia, and would punish such act by the emancipation of his slave. The word "depot" was not defined, and the fact was, there was no public place for the confinement of slaves, no slave market to which the word could apply.

I considered this law would be the triumph of abolitionism, which had for so many years flooded both Houses of Congress with petitions and memorials against the slave trade in the District of Columbia. I anticipated such a shout as went up from the abolition camp, when it was hailed as "a most important measure in the sight of justice," of which the newly elected Senator, Sumner, said "It practically affixes to the whole traffic, wherever it exists, not merely in Washington, within the immediate sphere of the Legislature, but every where throughout the slave States, whether Richmond or Charleston, or New Orleans, the brand of Congressional reprobation." It was to assume the power to emancipate a slave for one reason; and I held that to admit this would be to surrender the whole question to the discretion of Congress, which might for any other reason exercise the same power, even to the extent of the total abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. The chairman of the "compromise" committee admitted the power, whilst he denied the expediency of exercising it, and Mr. Chase of Ohio, informed us that the slave trade bill was the first step, but not the last.

To these considerations, which were sufficient to have decided my course, were added expressions of popular will evincing the most decided opposition to such a measure. At a public meeting, held in Jackson, in May, 1849, Judge Sharkey, the presiding officer, made an address which received the most general commendation. In that address he referred to the resolutions of the Legislature of Virginia, in 1847, and those of 1849, protesting against any action of Congress on the slave trade and slave [illegible] District of Co- re- ad, nd re- he ve y of lature must lect the pop- case, I never ut to instruct me, as the Senator of the State, nor did I require instructions to be formally given; it was enough for me only to choose between serving them according to their will, or returning to them the trust with which they had honored me.

At the last session of Congress, attempts were made to begin a stupendous scheme of Colonization of Free Negroes on the coast of Africa, by building and maintaining steam vessels at the public expense for that purpose. I opposed it, because it was not one of the objects for which the taxing power had been conferred upon the general government, and for many other reasons which the limits of this address, and the fact that the proposition then failed, induce me to abstain from offering to you. There was also a scheme for internal improvement by the general government, which I resisted, as I had on other occasions, and for such reasons as influenced me then. I much fear, however, that both these measures will succeed in the next Congress, when I have but little doubt it will also be attempted to modify the tariff of 1846, by increasing the duties upon coal and iron. It has already been indicated in the press as an expectation of Pennsylvania founded upon the promises made by Southern members during the controversy on the so-called compromise of 1850. But without including such bitter, bitter fruit in the estimate, I ask, what did Mississippi gain by the "compromise?" By the admission of California, the balance of power in the Senate was destroyed, that which had so long been guarded by bringing slave-holding States into the Union by pairs, and the North here thus acquired the control of all the departments of the government.—Mr. Cooper, a Senator from Pennsylvania, an advocate of the "compromise," and signer of the "Union" party pledge, spoke of it as conferring on the North the power to prevent the further acquisition of slave territory, or the extension of slavery beyond its guaranteed limits. We must pay our proportion of tax to supply the treasury with ten millions of dollars to pay for the purchase of a portion of Texas, and hereafter to supply the means of supporting a territorial government for the territory thus purchased; nor are we permitted to